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ABSTRACT

Sea otters are well known tool users, yet the cognitive capacities of other otter species
have been sparsely studied. Precedent exists for non-tool using species closely related to native
tool users to display comparable abilities under experimental conditions. The social intelligence
hypothesis predicts complex cognitive capacities in socially complex species. Using the Aesop’s
Fable paradigm – wherein subjects drop stones into a cylinder half-filled with water to acquire
floating out-of-reach food items – I assessed North American river otters’, Asian small-clawed
otters, and giant river otters abilities to solve a novel tool-mediated problem. Sticks and water
were presented with the stones, providing opportunities for tool use. No otters successfully
completed the task. Interaction with the apparatus decreased significantly across sessions,
possibly contributing to the otters not solving the task. A better understanding of the similarities
and differences in the cognitive abilities of these species can inform future conservation efforts.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem solving can be as straightforward as a hungry dog moving to an area where food
is available and as complex as an experienced chess player planning many moves ahead to win a
game. Both require that the problem solving agent engage in goal oriented behavior, but the
relative level of cognitive ability required for success is drastically different in each. The nearboundless breadth of behavior encompassed by the term problem solving has generated diverse
and dissonant definitions, each emphasizing the facets of problem solving most germane to the
author’s purposes. As the current study utilizes a complex problem solving task to assess
subjects’ cognitive capacities, Sternberg’s (2004) apposite definition of complex problem
solving as the process by which an animal can “overcome barriers between a given state and a
desired goal state by means of behavioral and/or cognitive, multistep activities ” (p. 147), is used
throughout this paper.
One of the earliest examples of problem solving being studied in animal subjects is the
research conducted by E. L. Thorndike (1898). In his landmark study, Thorndike placed cats in
puzzle boxes that could be opened from the inside by means of a latch. Over continued trials the
subjects learned to escape the box in less and less time, displaying relatively gradual learning
curves. Thorndike interpreted these results as demonstrating that cats possessed a well-developed
capacity for instrumental learning but there was not any evidence of anything resembling insight
which would have produced much steeper, if not vertical, learning curves.
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In stark contrast to Thorndike, Wolfgang Köhler (1924) believed that there was evidence
for non-trial and error learning, which he called insight learning, in nonhumans. In a series of
experiments, chimpanzees solved different problems including successfully stacking boxes to
obtain food items suspended out of their reach and employing sticks as tools to extend their reach
outside of their enclosure to obtain food items.
Köhler (1924) was one of the first to take advantage of the unparalleled number of
behavioral and morphological characteristics shared between chimpanzees and humans. These
commonalities continue to make chimpanzees one of the most popular subject animals to use for
cognitive testing (Kohler, 1924). The wealth of research that has been conducted on chimpanzees
has revealed that they are adept at using a variety of different tool types, defined by Shumaker,
Walkup, and Beck (2011) as “an external manipulable object used to alter the form or position of
another object or organism when the user holds and directly manipulates the tool and when the
animal is responsible for the orientation of the tool” (p. 5). Other great apes have also shown
themselves to be skillful tool users. However, our more distant primate cousins typically have
not been shown to use tools at as high a rate as great apes nor with the same level of
sophistication (Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010). For example, when eight chimpanzees and eight
capuchin monkeys (Cebus paella) were tested on their abilities to use and understand the
functional properties of probe tools, seven of the chimpanzees selected the correct tool based on
its length while only one capuchin was successful (Sabbatini et al., 2012). Cross species research
such as this is an invaluable tool for studying how, when, and under what conditions the
cognitive abilities underlying tool use evolved (MacLean et al., 2012).
In an expansive study of self-control in problem-solving tasks in 36 species MacLean et
al. (2014) point out the unfortunate paucity of such systematic studies, given their utility in
2

determining the characteristics of species and their environments that have resulted in the
problem solving abilities possessed by extant species. Of the 29 mammalian species represented
only six were nonprimates, raising the question of whether results regarding primate problem
solving are generalizable to nonprimate mammals. Carnivorans (members of the order
Carnivora) are one of the largest groups of mammals that have been sparsely researched (Drea &
Carter, 2009). Considering the ecological importance of many carnivorans as keystone species
(VanBlaricom & Estes, 1988) and problems facing many of its members concerning harmful
contact with humans and environmental changes (Boitani & Powell, 2012), it is unfortunate that
research concerning their abilities to problem solve and adapt to new circumstances has been so
sparse (Drea & Carter, 2009).
Holekamp, Sakai, and Lundrigan (2007b) point out that the Carnivora order offers many
species sharing environmental and social commonalities with primates facilitating cross-taxa
comparisons. Carnivorans and primates are estimated to have differentiated between 90 and 100
million years ago (Springer, Murphy, Eizirik, & O'Brien, 2003), making carnivorans far enough
removed to allow testing of whether hypotheses generated from the abundant primate research
are generalizable to more distantly related species. One carnivoran has received abundant
attention from cognitive scientists: the domestic dog. They have shown themselves to be
particularly adept at solving problems in social contexts (Topál, Miklósi, & Csányi, 1997). There
is also anecdotal evidence of some dogs even displaying limited tool use (Shumaker et al., 2011).
Researchers have also conducted comparative studies of dogs and wolves, which have revealed
that wolves oftentimes outperform domestic dogs on problem solving tasks (Frank & Frank,
1985). One study found that when six week old wolves and dogs were tested on the detour task
which required them to adaptively navigate around obstacles the wolves were more likely to
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solve the problem and solve it faster (Frank & Frank, 1982). Using a similar detour task, dingoes
(Canis dingo) have also been shown to possess well developed problem solving skills exceeding
those of domestic dogs (Smith & Litchfield, 2010). It is, however, difficult to consider studies
comparing canines to be true cross-phyla comparisons since their ability to interbreed means
they are not truly biologically distinct. As such, the differences in their problem solving abilities
may be more due to environmental factors than evolved genetic differences (Frank & Frank,
1982).
As such, it is interesting to compare and contrast the problem solving abilities of
evolutionarily farther removed species that through convergent evolution share many physical
and behavioral characteristics such as the distantly related wolf and spotted hyena (Crocuta
crocuta), in order to try to determine the causes of the similarities and differences. For example,
when presented with puzzle boxes as tests of problem solving ability both eastern timber wolves
(Canis lycaon) (Frank & Frank, 1985) and spotted hyenas (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012)
have readily solved the problem. The similar performance of these distantly related carnivorans
is not as surprising as it might seem since the social intelligence hypothesis predicts a positive
correlation between the degree of sociality in a species and the cognitive abilities of its members
(Dunbar, 2002).
The highly social spotted hyena has proven well-suited for testing the social intelligence
hypothesis of animal intelligence (Holekamp, Sakai, & Lundrigan, 2007a), which posits that the
demands of living in large cooperative social groups have driven the evolution of intelligence in
primates and other social species (Whiten & Byrne, 1997). One proposed mechanism of the
relationship between sociality and cognitive ability is that as members of a species become more
cohesive, possessing greater amounts of self-control becomes an increasingly adaptive trait. It
4

enables individuals to forgo immediate reinforcement to attain a greater delayed reward. Perhaps
more importantly for group living species, self-control allows animals to abstain from
immediately gratifying behaviors (such as taking another animal’s food) likely to result in
aversive consequences (Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007).
Studies demonstrating advanced social intelligence and cooperative problem solving
abilities in spotted hyenas have generally provided support for the social intelligence hypothesis
(Drea & Carter, 2009; Holekamp et al., 2007a). These studies provide great insights into the
convergent evolution of problem solving abilities in distantly related social species, but it is also
useful to study more genetically similar species living in diverse environments. This comparison
will allow for the clarification of relationships between the cognitive capabilities of different
species and the similar and dissimilar characteristics of their environme nts (MacLean et al.,
2014).
The Lutrinae subfamily (in the Mustilidae family of the Carnivora order comprises the
13 extant species of otters. This group is ideally suited for studies of cognitive similarities and
differences in a genetically similar but environmentally and socially diverse group of species.
The diversity of social structures observed in different otter species when compared to their
problem solving abilities can provide insight into what social variables are more or less related to
the development of novel problem solving abilities. The study of the Lutrinae subfamily also
allows comparison of the cognitive capacities related to tool-mediated problem solving in
primates and the most prolific nonprimate mammalian tool-user: the sea otter (Enhydra lutris)
(Byrne, 1995; Hall & Schaller, 1964).
Byrne (1995) suggests that of all non-primate mammalian tool-users, sea otters show the
most sophisticated and human-like tool use in a due to their use of stones of specific sizes and
5

shapes to open different hard-shelled prey species. Additionally, Sea otters have been observed
prying abalones off rocks using stones (Miller, Geibel, & Houk, 1974) or other available objects
such as glass bottles (Riedman & Estes, 1990). Byrne (1995) claimed that primates are
exceptional tool users because they use a single tool for multiple purposes, so sea otters using
stones to dislodge clams as well as break them open lends credence to the suggestion that sea
otters are similarly capable. Byrne also claimed that some species of primates exhibit tool-using
behavior indicative of “real intelligence” because they use different and distinct tools for a
variety of tasks. Observations of sea otter mothers wrapping pups in kelp to prevent them from
drifting away while the mother dives (Talbot, 2012) and of them wrapping live crabs in kelp for
containment while other prey is being eaten (Riedman et al., 1988 in Riedman, 1990) indicate
that sea otters may possess problem-solving capacities comparable to those of primates.
Interestingly, the sea otter is the only confirmed native tool-user in the Lutrinae
subfamily (Kruuk, 2006), although there is an unconfirmed report of African clawless otters
(Aonyx capensis) using stones as anvils to crack open mussel shells during a drought that made
their normal prey scarce and exposed the mussels (Donnelly & Grober, 1976). The sea otter’s
retractable claws and the specialized somatic sensory projections in their forelimbs are believed
to be adaptations for improved object manipulation and tool-use (Radinsky, 1968). This
proclivity for tool use is thought to have been driven by the sea otter’s reliance on hard-shelled
abalones which are plentiful in large portions of the sea otter’s natural range (Estes, Riedman,
Staedler, Tinker, & Lyon, 2003; Tinker, Bentall, & Estes, 2008). The relative rarity of hardshelled prey species in the habitats of other species of otters that do not use tools further supports
this explanation (Kruuk, 2006). However, sea otters may never have needed to utilize such an
energetically expensive prey species had it not been for the intraspecific competition created by
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the size and density of their pre-fur trade population, along with the steep metabolic
requirements associated with ranging as far north as Alaska while being the only major aquatic
mammal without blubber for insulation (Kruuk, 2006). Sea otters’ penchant for tool use allowed
them to utilize an otherwise unobtainable food source that they rely on in many parts of their
range. This raises the question of whether this crucial adaptation evolved in response to heavy
selection pressures as a domain-specific cognitive ability performed as a rote series of behaviors
or if it the species already possessed a more flexible domain-general cognitive ability which
facilitated rapid behavioral adaptability leading to the unique seemingly intelligent behaviors for
which the species is known.
The most recent common ancestor the sea otter shares with any other extant otter
speciated approximately 4.9 million years ago and they are believed to have come to inhabit its
current range roughly three million years ago (Koepfli et al., 2008). Given this phylogeny, if the
sea otter’s cognitive capabilities allowing tool-use are domain-general in origin and were present
before they could have been shaped by the abundance of hard-shelled prey in its current habitat,
then one could expect to find comparable cognitive capabilities in other otter species that are not
native tool users. However, if it is a domain-specific cognitive function, having evolved in
response to the unique characteristics of the sea otter’s environment, then comparable cognitive
capabilities would not be expected to be present in the other species of otter.
The Asian small-clawed otter (ASCO) may have the greatest potential to prove capable
of completing tasks requiring object manipulation because the genus Aonyx to which they belong
possess somatic sensory adaptations of the forelimbs similar to those of the sea otter which
enhance object manipulation capabilities (Radinsky, 1968). As their name suggests, the claws on
ASCOs’ forelimbs are much smaller than is typical in most other otter species, which allows
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them to manipulate small objects much more efficiently than their large-clawed relatives. It is
believed this adaptation evolved to allow ASCOs to more easily catch and handle the terrestrial
crabs that make up a larger portion of their diet compared to most other species of otter (Kruuk,
2006). This feeding pattern indicates that this adaptation evolved to facilitate object manipulation
in much the same way that the sea otter’s retractable claws are believed to (Radinsky, 1968).
They have also been shown to possess a well-developed spatial memory (Perdue, Snyder, &
Maple, 2013) that may suggest the presence of a similarly developed spatial reasoning ability.
While the ASCO is considered a social species, it is worth noting that of the three species in the
present study they are considered the least social because they often forage independently of
each other even when living in groups (Kruuk, 2006).
In stark contrast to the ASCO, the giant river otter (GRO) is considered by many to be the
most gregarious species of otter. They typically live in large interfamilial groups and cooperate
in raising and defending their young (Kruuk, 2006). GROs are one of the rare species that care
for each other’s young (Rosas, Cabral, de Mattos, & Silva, 2009). They also appear to have the
most complex and varied system of communication of any species of otter (Mumm, Urrutia, &
Knörnschild, 2014). While the sociality of the GRO is well documented, a search of the literature
failed to reveal any existing studies specifically addressing cognition in the species. However, it
must be noted that their natural habitat is the Amazon River basin, which provides no shortage of
impediments to researchers wanting to extensively observe them in the wild. Their low levels of
neophobia (fear of new things) mean they have a tendency to approach novel objects and stimuli
which when paired with the high value of their furs also causes individuals living near large
human settlements to have very low survival rates, further hindering the study of their behavior.
Although individuals cooperate on some tasks, such as predator defense, they have never been
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observed cooperatively foraging for food, which may indicate that they might not perform as
well on the cooperative problem solving task as their otherwise exceptional sociality might
predict (Kruuk, 2006).
Although North American river otters (NAROs) are typically considered marginally less
social than GROs (Kruuk, 2006), they are also the only otter species to have been directly
observed to forage cooperatively (Blundell, Ben-David, & Bowyer, 2002; Serfass, 1995).
Despite the distribution of NAROs throughout most of North America, there is a dearth of
research concerning their cognition. NAROs have also been known to display neophilic reactions
to nonthreatening novel objects (Tennessee Aquarium otter keepers, personal communication,
January 11, 2014), which may suggest that they will perform well on problem solving tasks
given that neophobia has been negatively correlated with success rates on problem solving tasks
in other social carnivorans (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012).
Even though GROs, NAROs, and ASCOs are not native tool-users it is possible that they
are capable of using tools under experimental conditions where there is sufficient motivation and
opportunity to do so. Such a phenomenon has been observed in the rook (Corvus frugilegus), a
social species that has never been observed using tools in the wild but has proven to be a highly
skilled tool user under captive conditions (Bird & Emery, 2009a, 2009b). Rooks are closely
related to the New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides), the tool use of which rivals that of
many primates (Taylor, Elliffe, Hunt, & Gray, 2010). New Caledonian crows have been shown
to manufacture hook tools out of both natural and manmade materials (Weir, Chappell, &
Kacelnik, 2002), exhibit metatool use surpassing that of many primates (Hunt & Gray, 2004;
Taylor et al., 2010), and use sticks as exploratory probes to investigate potentially dangerous
novel objects (Wimpenny, Weir, & Kacelnik, 2011).
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When captive rooks are presented with cognitively demanding tasks such as
manufacturing hooks to retrieve otherwise inaccessible food they have consistently outperformed
most species that are native tool users (Bird & Emery, 2009a). Most interesting is the rook’s
performance on Bird and Emery’s (2009b) problem solving task inspired by Aesop’s Fable,
wherein a crow is said to have dropped stones into a pot of water to raise the water level to the
point where it could drink. The researchers allowed rooks access to a clear vertical open-topped
tube one-third filled with water in which there was an out of reach floating worm and a variety of
stones of appropriate sizes to fit in the tube. All four rooks acquired the worm by dropping stones
into the tube until the water level was high enough for them to reach the worm despite no
previous exposure to this particular task. The spontaneous solving of the task is indicative of
insight which is further supported by the lack of trial-and-error problem solving and the absence
of any known species typical behaviors that would account for their success on the task.
The beauty of the Aesop’s Fable stone dropping task is that it is usable across a variety of
species (Jelbert, Taylor, & Gray, 2015) because it does not require fine manual dexterity in the
species being studied. Animals not able to hold and manipulate sticks or stick-like objects may
be cognitively capable of similar feats of problem solving but typical experimental conditions
assessing tool use may not be conducive to them successfully completing tasks requiring the
dexterous maneuvering of sticks or other objects. The stone dropping task developed by Bird and
Emery (2009b) may provide a workaround for this problem since picking up and dropping
appropriately sized stones may be more relevant to the physical affordances and behavioral
repertoires of many species.
Because of the utility of the Aesop’s Fable task, I modified it for use with otters. Two
additional types of tool were presented with the stones: a probe tool that could be used to
10

manually retrieve the fish and water that could be spit into the tube to bring the fish within reach
by raising the water level. The water was considered a tool that could potentially be used to
retrieve the fish, because it meets Shumaker, Walkup, and Beck’s (2011) previously mentioned
definition of a tool.
I hypothesized that each species would be able to solve this task using at least one of the
available tools. Each species is at least moderately social and as such would be predicted to
possess enhanced cognitive capacities based on the social brain hypothesis. While only the
ASCOs possess adaptations specifically related to object manipulation, both NAROs and GROs
have been reported to possess a proclivity for manipulating and playing with almost any
available objects (Kruuk, 2006). This tendency to spontaneously manipulate objects, along with
the lower levels of manual dexterity required to pick up stones compared to the higher levels
required for orienting the stick tool, led to my prediction that all species were equally likely to
use the stones but the ASCOs’ greater manual dexterity would make them more likely to use the
stick tool. Since all subject species are aquatic and morphologically similar (Kruuk, 2006), I also
hypothesized that they would be equally likely to solve the task using the available water.

11

CHAPTER II
METHOD

Subjects
Three species of otter were used as subjects. Two NAROs, a male (Slim, age 3.5) and
female (Lenora, age 12), were tested at the Birmingham Zoo. Two female ASCOs (Harry and
Nava Lee, ages 10 and 15 respectively) were tested along with two GROs, a female (Yzma, age
6) and male (Bakari, age 4.5) at Zoo Atlanta. Characteristics of each species are summarized in
Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Comparison of Species Characteristics (Kruuk, 2006)
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Materials
The subjects were presented with an open topped transparent vertical plastic cylinder,
partially filled with water and containing an out of reach floating food item. There were three
types of tool available for each otter to potentially use to solve the problem: stones, sticks, and
water. The stones were placed near the tube and were of a size that allowed the food item to
come within reach by raising the water level after approximately three were dropped in the tube.
The stick was of sufficient length to easily reach the floating food item. Water was provided in a
bowl if it was not already present and was also considered a potential tool.

Figure 2.1 Experimental Apparatus
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All sessions were video recorded with a Canon HFR400 camcorder set up on a tripod.
Additionally, there was a Go Pro Hero 3+ video camera secured several feet directly above the
apparatus providing a top down perspective. The Go Pro wirelessly streamed a live video feed to
an iPad Mini allowing ongoing observation of the experiment while keeping subject distraction
to a minimum.

Housing
Each species was tested in their indoor enclosure. For both the NAROs and GROs it was
possible to close off a smaller subsection as the testing area. The NARO testing area was 1.5
meters by 1.5 meters and was empty except for the experimental apparatus and potential tools.
The GROs were tested in a section of their indoor housing measuring three by three meters. The
GRO testing area contained bedding, crates, a plastic tub filled with water and large enough for
them to completely submerge, and a large plastic children’s castle.
It was not possible to keep the ASCOs in a smaller area during testing. The physical
affordances of their enclosure required the otter being tested to have access to the entire indoor
portion of their environment, excluding a switching area where the otter not being tested was
kept. The main area of the ASCO’s enclosure where they were tested consisted of a raised
concrete area (approximately three by four meters) and a recessed pool area (approximately 2.5
meters by 3 meters). Their indoor enclosure contained two otter shelters, logs, large rocks, and
the same kind of children’s play castle previously mentioned for the GROs.
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Procedure
The apparatus was placed in a screened off or separate area of the enclosure, a food item
was placed in the empty tube, and water was poured into the tube. The stones and stick tool were
placed near the apparatus and a container of water was provided. Once the apparatus and tools
were set up, the subject to be tested was brought in individually.
Day one of the experiment served as a habituation and orientation trial for each subject.
The apparatus was set up in the same manner as subsequent trials except that the stick tool and
stones were not present and the tube was nearly filled so that the food was easily reachable by
the otter. In subsequent sessions the water level was lowered until the food was out of the otter’s
reach. If this distance was misjudged and the otter manually retrieved the food, the session timer
was paused, the otter was shifted out of the testing area, the water level was lowered further,
more food was added, the otter was shifted back into the testing area, and the session timer was
restarted.
As planned, the NAROs completed ten sessions of 30 minutes each, however due to
limited keeper availability and apprehensions regarding isolation during testing, the ASCOs and
GROs were tested using 12 minute sessions. At least one of the otters’ regular keepers was
always present during testing. At the end of each session the otter was returned to its home
enclosure, the apparatus was reset, and the next otter brought in. The otters’ median number of
seconds to first contact with, mean numbers of approaches to, and mean numbers of reaches into
the apparatus were coded from the recorded videos and analyzed.

15

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Comparisons of Species
None of the six otters successfully completed the task. Only one otter interacted with the
stones. Yzma, the female GRO, purposefully pushed around one of the stones with her forepaw
on three occasions but never interacting with the tube. In sessions five and six the male NARO,
Slim, interacted with the provided sticks by chewing their ends. Slim’s stick oriented behavior
never progressed beyond species typical gnawing behavior so it was determined to be unrelated
to the experimental task. Only five of the planned ten sessions were completed with the GROs
due to keeper concerns about stress caused by the isolation of the testing procedure. Because a
session length of 30 minutes was used for the NAROs while 12 minutes sessions were used for
the ASCOs and GROs, only the first 12 minutes of the NARO sessions were used in the analysis
of the data concerning reaches and approaches in order to allow species comparisons. Data
concerning each otter’s median latency to first contact with, mean number of approaches to, and
mean number of reaches into the apparatus are summarized in Table 3.1.
Data analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS 22.0 software package. The data did
not meet the assumptions necessary for parametric tests so species comparisons were made using
the Kruskal-Wallace H test. Mann-Whitney U tests were then run to follow up on statistically
significant group differences. Additional analyses were carried out using SPSS’s linear
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regression procedure in order to tease out factors contributing to the overall results and observed
interspecies differences.

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics

The distributions of each species’ latency, approach, and reach scores were analyzed for
interspecies differences. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances indicated statistically
significant differences between the variances of the individual species’ latency distributions (W =
11.30, p < .001) as well as the variances of the distributions of their approaches (W = 3.673, p =
.034). Kruskal-Wallace H tests revealed statistically significant differences between the species’
latencies (χ2 (2) = 21.29, p <.001) and number of approaches (χ2 (2) = 12.11, p = .002) but not
their number of reaches (χ2 (2) = 3.52, p = .172).
To follow-up on the statistically significant Kruskal-Wallace results, three MannWhitney U tests were conducted to analyze both the latency and approach variables (see Tables
17

3.1 and 3.2). The distribution of GRO latencies were significantly shorter than the distributions
of NARO latencies (U = 10.5, p < .001) and ASCO latencies (U = 6.0, p <.001). The series of
tests conducted on the approach variable indicated that the GROs made significantly more
approaches compared to the ASCOs (U = 20.0, p < .001). Differences in the NARO and GRO
approach distributions verged on significance (U = 56.5, p = .054) while the differences between
the distributions of NARO and ASCO approaches did not (U = 139.0, p = .096).

Figure 3.1 Mann-Whitney U Tests for Interspecific Differences in Latencies
18

Figure 3.2 Mann-Whitney U Tests for Interspecific Differences in Approaches and Reaches

The amount of time elapsed from the start of the session to the otter’s first approach
tended to be positively correlated with session number. This relationship was statistically
significant for the ASCOs (p = .039) and but not for the NAROs (p = .062). This relationship
was reversed (see Figure 3.3) for the five sessions completed by the GROs but this negative
relationship was not significant (p = .203). Despite one GRO, Yzma, decreasing her latency
across the five sessions the GROs completed, age was still an exceptionally strong predictor of
latency, with R2 equaling 0.80 (p = .001) when median latencies were regressed onto each otters’
age. Even though Yzma was faster to approach the apparatus as sessions went on, this only
19

constituted a drop from her longest latency of three seconds to a median latency of two seconds
and one session with a one second latency. In contrast, the ASCOs and NAROs sometimes took
five minutes or more to approach the apparatus.

Figure 3.3 Latencies across Sessions Paneled by Species

The NAROs made significantly fewer approaches to the apparatus as sessions progressed
(p < .001). The same negative relationship was evident in the ASCO’s, however it was not
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statistically significant (p = .062). In contrast, the correlations between session number and
number of approaches was nonsignificant (p = .250) for the GROs (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 Approaches across Sessions Paneled by Species

The NAROs made significantly fewer reaches into the apparatus as sessions went on (p =
.007). The number of reaches made by the ASCOs was highly variable (see Figure 3.4) and
seemed to be relatively unaffected by session number (p = .320). The two GROs showed
opposite trends from one another. Figure 3.5 shows that Bakari’s results were similar to those of
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the ASCOs and NAROs in that his number of reaches regressed onto session number was not
significant (p = .071), whereas Yzma exhibited a significant (p < .001) linear increase in reaches
into the apparatus across sessions.

Figure 3.5 Reaches across Sessions Paneled by Species

Age Regressions
There was a strong tendency for latency to first contact with the apparatus to increase as
a function of age. Regressing each otter’s median latency to first contact onto their age yielded a
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statistically significant (p = .008) linear model (see Figure 3.6). Additionally, there was a strong
and significant (p = .027) negative relationship between the mean number of times each otter
approached the tube and its age (see Figure 3.7). There was a similarly strong and significant (p
= .018) negative relationship between each otter’s age and the mean number of times it reached
into the tube (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.6 Median Latency to First Contact with the Apparatus Regressed onto Otter Age

Figure 3.7 Mean Number of Approaches to the Apparatus Regressed onto Otter Age
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Figure 3.8 Mean Number of Reaches into the Apparatus Regressed onto Otter Age
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

The results of this study do not provide evidence for any of the three subject species
being able to use tools to solve a novel problem. However, given the small sample size of the
study (n = 2 for each species) these results should not be taken as definitive evidence that such
abilities are completely absent in these species. Testing was stopped after the fifth session for
GROs due to concerns regarding separation anxiety. This made the results particularly
inconclusive, given similar studies in which subjects have succeeded in more than five sessions
(Foerder et al., 2011). The high degree of sociality that made otters such interesting test subjects
ironically prevented the test from being completed. The inability to complete testing with the
GROs is particularly disappointing because Yzma was the only otter to increase her interactions
with the apparatus over time and purposefully interact with any of the potential tools when she
batted a rock around on three occasions.
There was a strong tendency for the otters to lose interest in the apparatus over time as
demonstrated by the positive correlation between session number and latency to first contact and
the negative correlations between session number and number of approaches and reaches.
Although keepers tried not feed them directly prior to testing, the otters were not deprived of
food for any set amount of time before testing. This may have reduced the motivation for the
otters to work for a food reward. However, Yzma was once again unique in that she did not seem
to lose interest in the apparatus over time. She was the only otter who steadily increased the
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number of times she reached into the tube across sessions. Yzma’s unique increase of interest in
the apparatus across sessions and manipulation of the rocks is another indicator that she might
have solved the problem given a longer testing period or more sessions.
There were significant group differences between the three species’ latencies to first
contact with and numbers of approaches to the apparatus. The GROs had significantly shorter
latencies than both the NAROs and ASCOs. The GROs also made significantly more approaches
to the apparatus than the ASCOs. It is possible that these differences along with the instances in
which the GRO Yzma batted around a stone are indicative of GROs being more neophilic in that
they possessed a greater proclivity for interacting with and manipulating novel objects as
measured by latencies, approaches, and reaches.
However, these group differences are also potentially attributable to differences in the
environments the species were tested in as well as the effect of subject age on neophilia. The
most striking difference in the testing environments is the discrepancy in their sizes. The
ASCOs’ testing area was roughly twice the size of the GROs’ testing area which was itself
approximately four times the square footage of the testing area used for the NAROs. ASCOs are
also less than half the size of GROs, making the relative functional sizes of their testing areas
even more discrepant. In light of these differences it is unsurprising that the ASCOs had the
longest latencies to first contact since it could have simply taken them longer to reach the
apparatus. If enclosure size was the predominant predictor of latency, then one would expect to
see the NAROs, who were tested in the smallest area, have the shortest latencies. However, since
the GROs had significantly shorter latencies than the NAROs despite being in a larger enclosure
it seems unlikely that testing area size alone accounts for the aforementioned group differences
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in latencies. The GRO’s also made significantly more approaches to the apparatus than did the
ASCOs, further supporting the idea that they possessed greater levels of neophilia.
Even though the GROs demonstrated more neophilia towards the apparatus than the
NAROs and ASCOs it is still possible that this effect was not caused by true interspecific
differences. Otter age was a particularly strong predictor of all three measures of neophilia:
median latency, mean number of approaches, and mean number of reaches. Previous studies
have shown that neophilia decreases/neophobia increases with age (Krueger, Farmer, & Heinze,
2014; Misanin, Blatt, & Hinderliter, 1985), so it is not surprising that an otter’s age was a
significant predictor of these variables. The effect of neophilia declining with age is important
when considering the GROs’ results. They were the youngest of the three groups, being 4.5 and
6 years old compared to the ASCOs 10 and 15 years of age and ages of 3.5 and 12 for the
NAROs. The effect of age on neophilia was particularly evident in the NAROs, given the wide
difference in their ages. Lenora was nearly four times older, and had a median latency (58
seconds) over four times longer than Slim (12 seconds), as well as fewer approaches to and
reaches into the apparatus, as seen in Table 3.1. One can thus reasonably make the claim that the
observed group differences in neophilia are at least in part due to the differences in the ages of
the otters belonging to each species. However, the small sample size of this study makes it
impossible to determine whether the variation of the neophilia measures is best explained by age,
group membership, or a combination of the two. To make this determination, future studies
would need an adequate sample size to run the age-neophilia regressions separately for each
species so that species membership could be assessed for its potential unique contribution to
neophilia.
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Limitations
Only finishing half of the sessions that had been planned with the GROs was a major
limitation of this study. The generalizability of the results is also limited by the sample size of
two otters for each species. The three species that were studied were chosen as a sample of
convenience based on their availability for study. Inclusion of sea otters in this study could have
provided interesting comparisons between native and nonnative tool-using otters. Studying
spotted-necked otters (Hyricitis maculicollis) would have been particularly informative given
that their evolutionary divergence occurred roughly 4.9 million years ago, making the spottednecked otter the sea otter’s closest relative (Koepfli et al., 2008). It also would have been ideal to
include a group of marine otters (Lontra felina) because of all extant otter species their
predominantly aquatic lifestyle is the most similar to the sea otter’s (Kruuk, 2006). As the
arguably least social species of otter because of their lack of group living other than mating pairs
(Kruuk, 2006), inclusion of the marine otter would also have provided a greater breadth of data
concerning social intelligence. While the inclusion of these species would have provided the
most additional insight, the inclusion of any of the ten members of the subfamily Lutrinae not
currently being tested would provide a more complete picture of the cognitive capabilities related
to problem solving and tool use in otters. Additional subjects in the species already represented
would provide more power for the analyses conducted.

Implications
The findings of this study did not demonstrate a capacity for tool use in the three species
that were tested. However, the small sample size of the study means that these results may not be
indicative of the abilities possessed by members of the three respective species. Future studies
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should include wild subjects to increase external validity given that differences in problem
solving often exist in wild versus captive populations (Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp,
2013).
An environmental threat common to all riparian otter species is the construction of
hydroelectric dams. These dams drastically alter the otters’ aquatic habitat as well as the
migration and distribution of many species of fish that otters prey on (Carter & Rosas, 1997). A
better understanding of the novel problem solving skills of these otter species will also be
informative regarding their abilities to adapt to these novel environmental characteristics. Otters
being opportunistic predators (Kruuk, 2006) often causes them to adapt to human proximity by
taking advantage of opportunities it provides, such as access to fish farms (Trindade, 1991).
These dense and immobile fish populations consistently provide wild otters with sufficient
motivation to gain access to these areas despite fish farmers’ best efforts to keep them out
(Kucerová, 1999). When humans and otters have conflicts, humans are unfortunately not always
as creative at keeping the otters out as the otters are at getting in. These circumstances often
result in the shooting or poisoning of the otters (Václavíková, Václavík, & Kostkan, 2011).
Greater knowledge concerning the exploratory behavior and problem solving abilities of otters
may lead to more effective and less harmful methods of deterring them from raiding fish farms.
A fuller understanding of the problem solving abilities of otter species in general and of the
differences between species may be informative in preventing otter-human conflicts from
occurring as well as foreseeing impacts of environmental changes.
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Conclusions
No evidence of tool using behavior was found in the three species of otter that were
tested. All but one of the otters lost interest in the apparatus as sessions went on, indicating that
further testing would have been unlikely to be beneficial. Age was shown to have a strong
negative effect on the amount of neophilia displayed toward the testing apparatus. The small
sample size of the study limited the generalizability of the findings. Further research with a
larger sample size may provide more significant results which will be helpful in the conservation
of otter species.
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